DOW自動生成181 頁
空軍任務報告（MISREP）
戰爭部 UAP 報告 d48 — 1996 年 9月
日期範圍1 SEPTEMBER 1996
出處／單位DOW
DOW 檔案系列中的空軍任務報告（MISREP），共 181 頁。文件中提及日期：1 SEPTEMBER 1996、19 FEBRUARY 1992、26 APRIL 1965、30 DECEMBER 1995。下方節錄與重點均自原檔文字層直接抽取。
重要性
USCENTCOM 任務情資報告，記錄美軍在中東執行任務期間觀察到的 UAP。
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機型
B-1
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- p.1EN· == -== -=--=-=------===--====-==-=--=-=-==-__;;;;._ ____________ _ RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE /RTI Contract No■-FO4703-91-C-0112 RTI Report No· RTl/5180/77-43F September 10, 1996 Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations 19961025 122 Final Report Prepared for Department of the Air Force 45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office - 45 SW/SE Patrick AFB, FL 32925 and Department of the Air Force 30th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office- 30 SW/SE Va…中文· == -== -=--=-=------===--====-==-=--=-=-==-__;;;;._ ____________ _ RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE /RTI Contract No■-FO4703-91-C-0112 RTI Report No· RTl/5180/77-43F September 10, 1996 Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations 19961025 122 Final Report Prepared for Department of the Air Force 45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office - 45 SW/SE Patrick AFB, FL 32925 and Department of the Air Force 30th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office- 30 SW/SE Va…
- p.2EN· FO4703-91-C-0112 RTI Report No· RTI/5180/77-43F Task No. 10/95-77, Subtask 2.0 September 10, 1996 Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations Final Report Prepared by James A中文· FO4703-91-C-0112 RTI Report No· RTI/5180/77-43F Task No. 10/95-77, Subtask 2.0 September 10, 1996 Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations Final Report Prepared by James A
- p.3EN· Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 0MB No. 0704-0188 Public tel)Ort1ng burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response. induding the time for reviewing instructions, searching exi5ting data sources. gathering and maintain in!,! the data needed, and completing and rev,ew,ng …· AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) ~.• REPORT DATE 1 3中文· Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 0MB No. 0704-0188 Public tel)Ort1ng burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response. induding the time for reviewing instructions, searching exi5ting data sources. gathering and maintain in!,! the data needed, and completing and rev,ew,ng …· AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) ~.• REPORT DATE 1 3
- p.4EN· Abstract Missile and space-vehicle performance histories contain many examples of failures that cause, or have the potential to cause, significant vehicle deviations from the intended flight line· This report shows how impacts from Mode-5 failures are modeled in program DAMP中文· Abstract Missile and space-vehicle performance histories contain many examples of failures that cause, or have the potential to cause, significant vehicle deviations from the intended flight line· This report shows how impacts from Mode-5 failures are modeled in program DAMP
- p.5EN· Simulations........... • ...................................................................... 31 6.1.1 Random-Attitu.de Failures ...............-............................................................... 31 6.1.2 Slow-Tum Failures ...............................................................................…中文· Simulations........... • ...................................................................... 31 6.1.1 Random-Attitu.de Failures ...............-............................................................... 31 6.1.2 Slow-Tum Failures ...............................................................................…
- p.6EN· Launch and Performance Histories .............................................................. 96 D.1 Basic Data ................................................................................................................. 96 D.1.1 Data Sources ...................................................................…中文· Launch and Performance Histories .............................................................. 96 D.1 Basic Data ................................................................................................................. 96 D.1.1 Data Sources ...................................................................…
- p.7EN· LLVl Breakup Percentages ..................................................................................................................... 69 Figure 30中文· LLVl Breakup Percentages ..................................................................................................................... 69 Figure 30
- p.8EN· Recursive Filter Factor for Last Data Point ........................................................ 94 Figure 37, Atlas Launch Summary..................................................................................... 102 Figure 38中文· Recursive Filter Factor for Last Data Point ........................................................ 94 Figure 37, Atlas Launch Summary..................................................................................... 102 Figure 38
- p.9EN· Thor Launch History ........................................................................................... 165 Vl RTI 9/10/96中文· Thor Launch History ........................................................................................... 165 Vl RTI 9/10/96
- p.10EN· When a missile or space vehicle malfunctions, people and facilities may be subjected to significant risks from falling inert debris, or from overpressures and secondary debris produced by a stage, component, or large propellant chunk that explodes on impact中文· When a missile or space vehicle malfunctions, people and facilities may be subjected to significant risks from falling inert debris, or from overpressures and secondary debris produced by a stage, component, or large propellant chunk that explodes on impact
- p.11EN· The function, which fills the void left by Modes 1 through 4, is sufficiently robust to include all possible impacts, yet seemingly comports with observed test results中文· The function, which fills the void left by Modes 1 through 4, is sufficiently robust to include all possible impacts, yet seemingly comports with observed test results
- p.12EN· Missile stability was lost at about 161 seconds, some 30 seconds after BECO, probably due to failure of the servo-amplifier power supply· The missile was destroyed by the RSO at 293.5 seconds, some 12 seconds after SECO中文· Missile stability was lost at about 161 seconds, some 30 seconds after BECO, probably due to failure of the servo-amplifier power supply· The missile was destroyed by the RSO at 293.5 seconds, some 12 seconds after SECO